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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
,
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
' Case No.
vs.
( 11052
VAL TAYLOR,
)
Defendant-Appellant. /

BRIEF OF APPELLAN1'

STATE.MENTO~--.

NATURE OF CASE

This is an action by plaintiff, STATE OF UTAH,
against defendant, VAL TAYLOR, for a violation of
Section 55-10-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended by the Laws of Utah, 1965, and more particularly, Sub-section ( l), to-wit:
"Any person eighteen ( 18) years of age or
over who induces, aids, or encourages a child
to violate any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, or who tends to cause children
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to become or remain delinquent, or who aids,
contributes to, or becomes responsible for the
neglect or delinquency of any child."
On the 15th day of February, 1967, Don Poulsen,
a Murray City police officer, filed a Complaint in the
Second District Juvenile Court as follows:
"The undersigned, being duly sworn, complains and alleges that the above defendant, over
the age of 18 years, in the above stated County,
State of Utah, did on or about the 9th day of
February, 1967, commit the crime of contributing to the delinquency and neglect of Shana and
Christine Sleater, children under the age of 18
years as follows: At the time and place aforesaid, said defendant, while said children were
in his custody, did take indecent.liberties on their
persons, and did require and induce said Shana
and Christine Sleater to perform oral sodomy
on his person; the defendant, by reason of the
above said acts did aid, contribute to, or become
responsible for the neglect and delinquency of
the said children."
DISPOSITION IN THE JUVENILE COURT
At the trial, the Honorable John Farr Larson,
hearing the evidence without a jury, found the defendant "guilty", a1_1d sentenced defendant to six ( 6) months
in the county jail.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
By this appeal, defendant seeks to reverse the
judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety and to
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obtain a dismissal, or, in the alternative, that the
matter be remanded to the Juvenile Court for a new
trail.
STATElHENT O:F' FACTS
The defendant, VAL TAYLOR, was married to
Carolyn Taylor on August 31, 1962, at Salt Lake City,
Utah. Prior to the marriage of Carolyn Taylor to
defendant, she had four ( 4) children, two ( 2) older
boys, and two ( 2) girls, Shana Sleater and Christine
Sleater, the girls in question in the trial, Shana Sleater
being of the age of seven ( 7) years and Christine
Sleater being of the age of six ( 6) years. The parties
also have a child of their marriage, Ryne Taylor, who
is four ( 4) years of age.
The Complaint in question was signed after l\'Ir.
and Mrs. Taylor had had marital difficulties and a time
when the two girls were living with their grandparents,
Arthur G. and Oneda I-Iedberg.
Prior to the trial on the matter, defendant by and
through his attorney had duly filed a Demand for Jury
Trial ( R. 134). This matter was initially set for trial on
the 21st day of April, 1967, and continued until July
10, 1967. Pursuant to a telephone call from the Juvenile
Court, defendant's attorney was informed if he insisted
upon a jury trial in this matter that the matter would
be transferred to a City court, and defendant's attorlley, ,vithout consultation with defendant, waived the
jury trial.
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At the trial on the matter, the only testimony on
behalf of the State of Utah was the testimony of the
two children, Shana Sleater and Christine Sleater
( R. 4 through R. 36) .

ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE JUVENILE COURT SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS OF ITS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE COMl\tIISSION OF THE OFFENSE ALLEGED ON OR ABOUT THE
9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1967.
On the trial of the matter, the only evidence as to
the time that the alleged offense had occurred was on
cross examination by l\1r. Olsen, attorney for defendant,
said testimony of Shana Sleater being as follows:
Q. Do you remember how long ago this was
supposed to have happened, Shana? Was it
a month ago?

A. I don't know.
Q .. You don't remember when this was supposed
to have happened? How long before you
went to live with your grandmother was it
supposed to have happened?

A. I don't know.
Q. Do you remember of telling this to a police-

man?
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A. No. (R. 12, R. 13)
Q. You don't know when this happened?

A. No.
Q. Was it a year ago?
A. I don't know.
Q. Two years ago?

A. I don' tknow. (R. 17, L. 15 thru 20)
On direct examination of Christine Sleater by l\lr.
Hansen, Deputy County Attorney, as to when the act
was supposed to have occurred, the following evidence
was given:
Q. What time of the day-do you remember
when it happened?

A. I don't remember.
Q. You don't remember?
A. Yeah, I remember it was last year. (R. 25,
L. 31, R. 26, L. 1 thru 3)
Further, on cross examination of Christine Sleater,
the following testimony was given:
Q. Do you remember how long ago this was
supposed to have happened, Christy, before
you went to live with your grandma?
I. It happened the day-it happened when we
were moving to a-it happened when-I
don't know. (R. 29, L. 22 thru 26)
Q. Do you remember the day the house caught
on fire?

A. No.
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Q. Don't you remember the day the house caught
on fire?

A. No, but I knew it got on fire.
Q. 'Vas this before or after that?

A. No.
Q. Was it before?

A. I don't know when it was.
Q. You just don't know when it was? Could it
have been last year?

A. I don't know. It was last year when I lived
with him. That is when the fire was.

Q. Were you going to school part of the day?
Was it during school time?

A. No.
Q. It wasn't during school time?

A. No.
Q. You were home all day?
A. No, we just got-we just-it wasn't school
when we did it. (R. 31, L. II thru 31. R. 32,
L. I)
It is admitted that the State is not required to
establis4 that the crime was committed on the precise
date alleged in the Complaint. However, the State alleges in said Complaint that the crime was committed
on or about the 9th day of February, 1967, and is
required by taking such election as to date to show
that the crime in fact was committed on or about the
date as alleged by said Complaint. This principle was
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applied in State v. Pace, 187 Ore. 498, 212 P. 2d 755,
in which case the defendant was accused of sexual intercourse with a minor daughter. The Oregon court ruled
as follows:
"The state was not required to establish that
the crime was committed on the precise date alleged in the indictment. It was, however, in
keeping with its election, required to show that
the crime was committed 'on or about August
20, 1948'. The state, in using the words 'on or
about' in making its election, did not thereby put
the time of the offense at large, but meant that
the time, August 20, 1948, was stated v1rith proximate accuracy."
See also Stephen v. State, 207 Ind. 388, 193 N.E. 375;
Crawford v. Arends, 351 l\iio. llOO, 176 S.,¥". 2d. 1.
Further, in the case of State v. Rodman, 44 N.1\1.
162, 99 P. 2d. 711, in which case the defendant had
been charged with statutory rape, the New l\iexico
court stated:
"To men of common sense, as members of a
jury or presumed to be, the expression 'on or
about' does not mean a variation of three or four
months. The common understanding of the words
'on or about' when used in connection with a
definite point of time, is that they do not put the
time at large, but indicate that it is stated with
approximate accuracy."
As stated in 23 C .J. S., Criminal Law, Section
1196, Page 746:
"'Vhere the prosecution elects to proceed for
an offense as of a certain date, the instructions
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should limit the jury to finding whether the offense was committed on that date."
Further, in State v. MacMillan, 46 Ut. 19, 145 P.
833, a case involving indecent liberties with a minor
child, the defendant by way of appeal urged that the
time that the alleged offense was committed was not
proven. The Utah court stated:
"It is true the little girl could not give the
date, nor the month, nor the year; but the time
was sufficiently proved by other facts and circumstances."

In the case now before this court, there was no
other testimony whatsoever by any persons except the
six and seven year old children, and as such there were
no other facts, circumstances or testimony which would
in any way allow the court to come to any conclusion
by which it could be determined that the crime, if
committed, could have been committed on or about
the 9th day of February, 1967.
Point 2.
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN CONVICTION.
As stated previously, the only evidence presented
by the State was the testimony of the two minor children, ages six and seven ( R. 4 through R. 36) . From
the general reading of the testimony of these young
young childretn, the court should have dismissed the
action as being not in harmony with general experience,
8

coupled with the doubtful testamentary capacity of
said minor children, and further, from a general reading
of the testimony it should appear clear to this court
that said children did not have testamentary capacity.
In regard to capacity, see the questioning by Mr.
Hansen of Shana Sleater, R. 4, wherein Shana gave
no answers which appear on the record as to ability
of whether Shana knew the difference between right
and wrong or the penalty or punishment as to lying,
and further, see the following testimony as to lying:

Q. Do you ever lie?

A. Sometimes. (R. 5, L. 9)
Further, on cross examination by the defendant's attorney:
Q. Do you know what a lie is, Shana?

A. No. (R. 18, L. 13)
Q. Have you ever had a whipping for telling
lies?

A. Yes. (R. 21, L. 8)
See also cross examination of Christine Sleater by
defendant's attorney:

Q. Now, Christy, have you ever had a spanking
for telling lies?

A. Yes. (R. 28, L. 17)
In regard to testimony as to the coaching of the
children, see the following on cross examination by
defendant's attorney of Shana Sleater:
9

Q. Now, Shana, did somebody tell you to say
these things in court today?
A. My mother did.

Q. Your mother did? Have you talked to your
grandmother about it?

A. Yes.
Q. Did she go over the story with you?

A. Yes. (R. 12, L through 14)
Q. Did your grandmother tell you to tell these
things in court?

A. Yes. (R. 13, L. 24)
Also, in examination by defendant's attorney of
Mrs. Oneta Hedberg, the children's grandmother, with
whom the children had been living, Mrs. Hedberg admitted going over the story with the children both prior
to talking to the Deputy County Attorney and before
coming to court ( R. 73 and 7 4) .
In the examination by Nolan J. Olsen, attorney
for defendant, of Mrs. Carolyn Tayor, the mother of
the children, Mrs. Taylor stated emphatically that the
children had never at any time mentioned the alleged
occurrence to their mother. More particularly, see testimony questions and answers as follows:

Q. Did these children ever mention anything to
you about an alleged offense?

A. No.
Q. Never?
A. Never.
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Q. \Vhen did you first hear about this offense?

A. On February 14.

Q. Hut they never said anything to you?
A. They never said anything to me. ( R. 46 and
47)

In regard to testamentary capacity, it is admitted
that a child of any age can testify if they meet certain
qualifications. In this regard, \Vhigmore on Evidence,
Section 495, sets out the basis as follows:
" ( 1) First, it involves a capacity mentally at

understand the nature of questions put and
to form and communicate intelligent answers.

( 2) Secondly, does it involves a sense of moral

responsibility, of the duty to make the
narration correspond to the recollection and
knowle...dge ,that is, to speak the truth as
he sees it? It would seem that the clear
absence of such a sense would disqualify
the witness."

'I'his test was set forth in State v .Williams, 111 Ut.
347, 180 P. 2d 551, which was a case involving the rape
of a thirteen ( 13 year old girl, in which case the court
decided that the thirteen year old girl, who had a mental
age of between eight and ten, did not meet the test
set forth by Mr. \Vhigmore. Further, the court stated:
"\Ve have before us not merely a happening
which must be considered not in harmony with
general experience, coupled with the doubtful
testimonial capacity of the only witness to the
principal fact in issue."
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In the case of State v. Madrid, 7 4 Ida. 200, 259
P. 2d. 1044, the father of an eleven ( 11) year old
daughter was convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon her, and the Idaho court reversed,
stating:
"Our public policy requires corrobation of
testimony of the complaining witness in the
prosecution for lewd and lascivious acts, either
by direct evidence or evidence of surrounding
circumstances, which clearly corroborate the
statements made by the complaining witness."
Further, in People v. Evans, 39 C.A. 2d., 242, 246
P. 2d, 636, the California court in reversing a conviction
for molesting of a IOl/2 year old girl stated:
"Although her testimony was not inherently
improbable as to be worthy of no belief, it was
open to attack on the ground that it shows that
she had been suggestively questioned as to the
crime by the police."
In the text, General View of the Criminal Law of
England, by J. F. Stephen, the following appears:
"A child will have been taught to say that,
if it tells a lie, it will go to the bad place when
it dies (which, usually taken to show that it knows
the meaning of an oath) long before it has any
real. notion of the practical importance of its
evidence in a temporal point of view; and also
long before it has learned to distinguish between
its memory and its imagination, or to understand
in the least degree, what is meant by accuracy
of expression. It is hardly possible to cross examine a child, for the test to too rough for an
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immature mind. However gently the questions
may be put, the witness grows confused and
frightened, partly by the tax on its memory,
partly by the strangeness of the scene; and the
result is that its evidence goes to the jury practically unchecked, and has usually greater weight
than it deserves, for the sympathies of the jury
are always with it. This is a considerable evil,
for in infancy the strength of the imagination
is out of all proportion to the power of the
other faculties; and children constantly say what
is not true, not from deceitfulness, but simply
because they have come to think so, by talking
or dreaming of what has passed."
Based upon the evidence and the general tenor
of testimony of the two young girls as to understanding,
coupled with the fact that testimony was given as to
coaching, and, further, that the children at no time
had ever mentioned the acts in question to their mother,
and, further, coupled with the evidence of the grandparents and the mother as to the bitterness and hatred
toward the defendant by the grandparents, the Hedbergs, the court should have granted a dismissal on
the basis that the prosecution did not meet the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was guilty of the crime as alleged.
Point 3.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN NOT ALLO,VING DEFENDANT TO RECALL PROSECUTION WITNESSES FOR
FURTHER CROSS EXAMINATION.
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Because of the inconsistency in the testimony of
the grandparents, Hedbergs, and the mother, Carolyn
Taylor, and the testimony of the two infant children,
defendant should have been given an opportunity to
further cross examine the said children.
In this regard, it is recognized that it is left to
the court's discretion as to recalling a witness for
further cross examination unless it can be shown that
the denial to recall said witness is a manifest abuse of
discretion.
Due to the fact that the entire case of the prosecution was based on the testimony of the two young
girls, a recall of said girls should have been allowed.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the trial court erred in not
granting defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's evidence based on the State's failure
to show a time sequence as alleged by the Complaint
wherein the Complaint alleged that the act occurred
on or about the 9th day of February, 1967, and having
made an election as to the time of said act the State
was required to show that the act was committed on
or about said date. Further, based on the over-all testimony, the court should have granted a dismissal based
on the failure of the State to meet the burden of proof
as being not in harmony with general experience,
coupled with the doubtful testimonial capacity of the
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two very young witnesses, and it is submitted that the
judgment heretofore entered by the Juvenile Court
should be dismissed, or, in the alternative, that it Le
remanded to the Juvenile Court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

NOLAN J. OLSEN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Val Taylor
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